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Tax Evasion, the Provision of Public 
Infrastructure, and Growth: A General 
Equilibrium Approach to Two Very 
Different Countries, Egypt and 
Mauritius.1 
Andrew Feltenstein, Jeffrey Condon, and Biplab Kumar Datta 
Georgia State University 
 
ABSTRACT 
We construct a dynamic multi-period general equilibrium model and use it to analyze prospects 
for growth in two very different countries, Egypt and Mauritius.  The use of a single model has 
the advantage that when comparing alternative policies across countries, it is not necessary to 
worry if different conclusions are based solely upon model differences, as would be the case with 
multiple models.   
In the case of Egypt we look at the effects of the revolution of 2011 on growth, in particular, at 
the impact of a dramatic decline in tourism.  In addressing the issue of how to increase growth 
we focus upon a particular problem in Egypt, namely the low rate of tax compliance.  
Accordingly, we look at fiscal policies designed to reduce tax evasion, and find that these 
policies are also successful in modestly increasing GDP growth. 
Mauritius has not suffered from any immediate shock, as has Egypt.  However shortages in 
public infrastructure have been identified as bottlenecks in GDP growth, which has slowed in 
recent years.  We therefore estimate elasticities of private production with respect to stocks of 
public infrastructure, and use these elasticities to implement our general equilibrium model.  We 
find that modest increases in spending upon public infrastructure, compensated for by 
corresponding decreases in current spending, can lead to increases in real GDP growth.  Beyond 
certain levels, however, more infrastructure spending will actually lead to a decline in real GDP 
growth. 
  
                                                          
1
 We would like to thank Nour Abdul-Razzak of the University of Chicago, who did important earlywork on 
Egyptian tax evasion that greatly helped us, Professor Hanan Nazier of Cairo University, who provided us with the 
social accounting matrix that formed the basis for the Egyptian general equilibrium model, and the late Professor 
Manal Metwaly of Cairo University, who was responsible for starting this project and whom we greatly miss.  
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I. Introduction  
The analysis of real economic growth in developing countries often focuses upon the 
important role played by the public sector, as well as the response of the private sector to public 
policies.  More specifically, certain economies may appear to face impediments to growth that 
are either the result of public policies, or that might be alleviated by changed public policies.  In 
this paper we will look at two such countries, Egypt and Mauritius, each of which wishes to 
increase its real growth rate yet faces obstacles that are quite different for each country. 
Egypt has suffered a decline in real growth rates since the events of 2011.  The most 
immediate causes of this decline have been a drop in tourism and a decline in foreign direct 
investment (FDI).  At the same time, the country has long term problems with tax evasion.  We 
will use an intertemporal general equilibrium model to see whether changes in the fiscal regime, 
designed to reduce tax evasion, can also enhance real growth.  Mauritius, on the other hand, 
faces bottlenecks caused by shortages of public infrastructure.  Is it possible to use the same 
structural model to analyze Mauritius’ growth problems that we use for Egypt?  Doing so would 
allow us to avoid the question of whether different outcomes for different countries were simply 
a result of using alternative models, rather than inherent differences between the countries.   
We will now briefly describe the current economic situations of Egypt and Mauritius.  
We will then outline the general equilibrium model we use to analyze growth enhancing fiscal 
policies for the two countries.  We then will use numerical implementations of the model, based 
upon data for the countries, to draw certain policy conclusions. 
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II. Country Backgrounds 
 
a. Egypt 
Over the past twenty years, Egypt has transformed its economy.  Beginning in 1991 with 
the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program, Egypt restored macroeconomic 
equilibrium by increasing the role of the private sector, relaxing price controls, reducing trade 
restrictions, and reducing inflation and budget deficits.  Modest tax reform took place in 2001 
with the general sales tax extended to the wholesale and retail sectors.  Major reforms were 
enacted in 2005. The top personal income tax rate was decreased from 32% to 20%.  Taxes on 
corporate profit were cut from 40% to 20% on profits under 10 million EGP and 25% on profits 
above. Property tax rates were cut from 46% to 10%.  Sales taxes were standardized and cut 
from 46% to 30% for luxury goods, 3% to 0% for essential goods, and a uniform rate of 10% for 
all non-luxury, nonessential goods.   
Following the major fiscal and monetary reforms in 2005, Egypt’s economy tracked in a 
generally positive direction.  Growth rates reached as high as 7.2% before the financial crisis, 
and afterwards reached a low of 4.7%.  Unemployment fell from a 2005 rate of 11.5% to 9% in 
2010.  Debt to GDP fell to 70% in 2008 from 103%.  Inflation, however, rose from 4.7% to 
20.2%. In January of 2011 The direct effects of the revolution on the economy were large.  
During the revolution, crime rates rose causing tourism to fall dramatically.  Tourism in 2010 
accounted for 13% of GDP, 11% of total employment, $14 billion in export revenue, and 22% of 
total exports (WTTC, 2010).   According to the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and 
Statistics (CAPMAS), in 2011 tourism fell by one third. Outside sources have put the figure as 
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high as 70%
2
.  After the revolution, unemployment increased from 9% to 12.1%, real GDP 
growth fell from 5.1% to 1.8%. 
 The new Egyptian government has inherited an economy with significant problems. GDP 
growth fell to an annualized rate of 1% in the first quarter of 2014.  GDP forecasts for 2014 are 
between 2% and 2.5%.  The deficit is currently at 13% of GDP with a debt to GDP ratio of 
nearly 90%.  Aid from Saudi Arabia and others has kept foreign reserves above the 3 month 
minimum, but inflation has recently increased over the last few months from the 7.6% annual 
rate to a monthly rate revealing annual inflation of more than 13%.   
 
TABLE 1 – Egyptian Economy Before and After 2005 Tax Reforms and 2011 Revolution 
Year 
Nominal GDP 
(Billion US$) 
Real GDP 
(Billion EGP) 
Real GDP 
Growth Rate 
Price Index 
(1999 = 100) 
Inflation 
Rate 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Gov’t Debt 
(% of GDP) 
2000 100 355 5.4 101.1 1.1 9.0 n/a 
2001 97 367 3.5 103.4 2.3 8.8 n/a 
2002 86 379 3.2 106.2 2.7 10.1 90.4 
2003 81 391 3.2 110.5 4.1 11.3 102.3 
2004 79 407 4.1 123.4 11.7 10.5 101.5 
2005 90 425 4.5 129.2 4.7 11.5 103.3 
2006 107 454 6.8 138.5 7.2 10.9 90.3 
2007 130 487 7.1 150.4 8.6 9.2 80.2 
2008 162 521 7.2 180.7 20.2 8.8 70.2 
2009 189 546 4.7 198.7 10.0 9.5 73.0 
2010 219 574 5.1 220.0 10.7 9.0 73.2 
2011 236 584 1.8 245.9 11.8 12.1 76.6 
2012 262 597 2.2 272.5 10.8 12.3 80.6 
2013 271 609 2.1 289.5 6.2 13.0 89.5 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2014 
**At an exchange rate of $1=£0.155, Egyptian Nominal GDP is approximately £1,753 in 2013. 
 
                                                          
2
 It is difficult to use CAPMAS data for tourism because Tunisian, Libyan, and other refugees cannot be separated 
from tourists.   
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Tax Evasion 
  High levels of tax evasion represent serious challenges for many developing nations as 
they seek to grow and to expand their public services. With trade liberalization being a part of 
many reforms in developing nations, there is a need to increase domestic revenues to replace the 
revenues lost from decreased tariffs (Toye 2000). Furthermore, there is the threat of a large 
informal economy, with citizens migrating to the informal economy if taxes are too high or too 
cumbersome to pay (Turnovsky and Basher 2009). There is a need to develop policies that can 
creatively increase tax compliance while also promoting economic growth.   
Egypt is an interesting case as it has transformed itself in the past thirty years from being 
an economy dominated by the public sector to a private sector and market-oriented economy 
(Dobronogov et al. 2005). At the same time, Egypt has implemented a series of tax reforms.  
Although many other Arab countries have undergone tax reforms and structural adjustment 
programs, Egypt is the largest and most diverse non-oil based Arab economy to undergo such 
extensive reforms. Egypt has seen moderate growth since the structural adjustment programs 
were implemented.  However following the global financial crisis of 1997 and a domestic 
financial scandal of 1998, Egypt’s economic growth initially slowed and failed to maintain a 
higher growth rate. Prior to the revolution, negative global shocks continued and Egypt’s fiscal 
situation deteriorated with budget deficits steadily increasing.  According to the IMF, fiscal 
vulnerabilities remain as Egypt’s main macroeconomic risk (“Arab Republic of Egypt…” IMF 
2010).  
 Egypt’s tax revenue to GDP ratio in 2010 was only 14.1%3, which is relatively low 
compared to other Arab economies of similar size and nature, indicating the need to explore 
                                                          
3
 Some additional revenue is obtained from Suez Canal fees that is not included in the tax to GDP ratio, but the ratio 
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policies to curb tax evasion and improve growth rates. Determining the extent to which the tax 
administration in Egypt is a significant constraint on private sector development is vital. A 
survey done by the World Bank
4
 in 2004 of 1000 enterprises found that tax-related issues were 
ranked as severe by almost 80% of the participants (“Egypt National Investment…” OECD 
2006). Tax authority officials are known to exercise significant discretion in applying rules 
related to enterprise regulation and public service access. Furthermore, tax laws are excessively 
complex, thereby giving more room for the tax authority to act in discriminatory ways (“Egypt 
Country Profile…” 2004). These issues have led to an underreporting of income, tax evasion 
and, as a result, low revenues for the government. 
Egypt’s tax to GDP ratio falls well below that of other neighboring Arab countries with 
similar economies, such as Morocco (at 24%), Tunisia (at 21%) and Jordan (at 20%). This 
further emphasizes Egypt’s weak fiscal situation, possibly the result of high tax evasion.  The 
problem, as with many others, was exacerbated by the revolution with the tax revenue as a 
percent of GDP falling to 13.2%.  This puts Egypt slightly below Columbia (13.3%) and slightly 
above Uganda (13%).    
A World Bank Investment Climate Survey from 2004 found that access to finance and 
the associated cost are the main reasons constraining SME’s investment and growth. Credit to 
the private sector has averaged around 40% of GDP in the past 5 years. Access to bank credit is 
needed to support the growth of the private sector, and could partially replace self-financing and 
the now absent FDI. A survey conducted by the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies found a 
mismatch between banks’ excess lending capacity and the volume of loans provided to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
only increases to 16.8% with its inclusion. 
4
 World Bank Investment Climate Survey of Egypt 
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private sector (Abdel-Kader 2006). The main source of financing was the firm’s own funds 
(retained earnings) for a majority of firms (70%).  
Egyptian Informal Sector 
With an estimated 8.2 million people in the informal sector (37% of the workforce), there 
is great opportunity to broaden the tax base (World Bank 2010). A USAID report found that 
between the years of 1998 and 2006, the informal economy grew at an annual rate of 5.3% 
(Alissa 2007). Furthermore, USAID found that about 40 to 60% of the cost of doing business 
results from the cumbersome regulatory framework that promotes the informal economy. Very 
few studies have explored the nature of the informal economy in Egypt. One notable study, led 
by economist Hernando de Soto was concluded in 2004 by the Institute for Liberty and 
Democracy. De Soto led years of fieldwork and analysis for the Egyptian government to 
determine how much of the economy operated “extralegally” (de Soto 2011). 
His study concluded that the underground economy was the nation’s biggest employer in 
2004. He found that 9.6 million people worked in the extralegal sector while 6.8 million were 
employed in the private sector and 5.9 million in the public sector.  Furthermore, 92% of 
Egyptians hold their property without normal legal title. Without any legal title to assets and real 
estate, entrepreneurs cannot leverage these assets as collateral for loans or investment capital. As 
a result, the majority of enterprises remain small and poor. de Soto estimated that the value of 
these extralegal business and property (in both the rural and urban parts of Egypt) to be $248 
billion at the time, 6 times greater than total savings and deposits in commercial banks in Egypt 
and 30 times more than the market value of the companies registered in the Cairo Stock 
Exchange at the time.  The survey also identified the primary causes for extralegality in Egypt, 
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notably the convoluted and redundant legal requirements for the various stages of a firm’s 
development. The primary cause identified for the difficulty of expansion is the lack of access to 
credit. de Soto’s findings have been confirmed by other Egyptian studies and surveys.  
A World Bank Investment Climate Survey from 2004 found that access to finance and 
the associated cost are the main reasons constraining SME’s investment and growth. Credit to 
the private sector has averaged around 40% of GDP in the past 5 years. Access to bank credit is 
needed to support the growth of the private sector, and could partially replace self-financing and 
the now absent FDI. A survey conducted by the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies found a 
mismatch between banks’ excess lending capacity and the volume of loans provided to the 
private sector (Abdel-Kader 2006). The main source of financing was the firm’s own funds 
(retained earnings) for a majority of firms (70%). 
Given these findings, we see that even after the 2005 tax reforms, evasion and informality 
remain key impediments for growth. Table 1 displays key indicators of the Egyptian economy 
before and after the 2005 tax reforms and the revolution. Inflation continues to rise and impede 
investment and confidence in the stability of the Egyptian economy. Furthermore, despite efforts 
to reduce public spending, public domestic debt has increased to 90% compared to an average of 
50% in the Middle East and North Africa (Achy 2010). 
Comparisons within the MENA region and further abroad have shown the detrimental 
effects of wide tax evasion and informality found in Egypt. Given the difficult economic times, 
the revolution, and the inefficient tax system, new policies are needed to stimulate growth, 
increase revenues, and increase private sector access to credit. As explained below, this model 
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accommodates the large amount of tax evasion and informality as it relates entry to the 
underground economy to tax rates and the need to access the banking system.   
b. Mauritius: Infrastructure Bottlenecks and Growth 
Mauritius is one of the great success stories of modern Africa.  Despite weak growth in 
Europe, its main trading partner, the country has managed to sustain steady growth for the past 
15 years, as indicated in the table below.
5
  In addition, the country has had steady growth rates in 
real per capita GDP, primarily because of it low population growth rate.  Nonetheless, real 
growth has slowed and the country is looking for ways to increase growth.   
Mauritius  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Real GDP  7.5 5.2 3.8 4.1 4.7 2.5 4.9 5.4 4.6 3.1 4.0 3.8 3.3 3.7 
 
Recent studies by both the International Monetary Fund and the African Development 
Bank have identified infrastructure deficiencies and related structural bottlenecks in the 
production system as having significant negative effects upon productivity and capacity 
utilization. According to the African Development Bank, “…, a US$10billion infrastructure 
program has been announced to accompany the reform initiatives. A ten year Economic and 
Social Transformation Plan (ESTP) scheduled for approval in June 2014 translates the HIC 
agenda into strategic priority actions. The ESTP focuses on five priority areas (i) Increasing 
Competitiveness (ii) Developing infrastructure (iii) Strengthening human capital and social 
inclusion (iv) Enhancing Public Sector Efficiency and (v) Promoting Sustainable Environment.” 
                                                          
5
 Source: http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=mp&v=66 (Mauritius GDP tables); IMF- 
MAURITIUS 2014 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION—STAFF REPORT; PRESS RELEASE; 
AND STATEMENT BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR MAURITIUS. 
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According to recent surveys, the private sector in Mauritius considers inadequate 
infrastructure to be a key problem facing enterprises wishing to do business in the country. It 
should be noted that Mauritius has the best telecommunication infrastructure in Africa. However, 
the ADB estimates that road transport congestion costs the economy an about 1.2% of GDP.  
Also, about 83% of the electricity used in the country is generated from imported fuel oil, 
thereby putting pressure in the balance of payments as well as undermining security. The 
government of Mauritius has therefore embarked upon an ambitious infrastructure program 
described below by the ADB. 
“The objective of the GoM’s infrastructure program is to develop a world class economic 
and social infrastructure to improve the delivery of public services and the competitiveness of the 
economy. About US$4.5bn worth of investment has been programed for period 2013-2017 of 
which about 80% will go into economic sectors such as transport, utilities and communication. 
Financing will be through contribution from the Government (38%), public enterprises (13%), 
and private sources including FDI (22%). About 26% will be met through additional local and 
foreign borrowing. Development partners are expected to contribute about US$1.27billion (28%) 
with the Bank as the lead partner (44%) followed by AFD(18%) and EU, Government of China, 
World Bank, EIB, BADEA and Government of India providing the rest. About US$1.93billion 
of the program is expected to be implemented through the Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
modality including (i) The Road Decongestion Program Phase I worth US$1.2 billion which is in 
advanced stages of negotiations. (ii) The CT Power Coal Project which has experienced delays 
due to controversies related to the contract and environmental license award (iii) The Light Rail 
Mass Transit System had a market sounding session (MSS) in 2012 (iv) Coal-fired Independent 
Power Plant and (vi) Lease contract in water sector.”6  
This resilience of the Mauritian economy, in the face of the overall world economic 
slowdown, has been at least partially the result of a series of fiscal programs. However, the 
government believes that the economy is operating below capacity. Closing this capacity gap 
will require addressing infrastructure shortfalls, thereby improving the efficiency of both 
particularly state-owned enterprises, as well as privately owned enterprises.  More specifically, 
                                                          
6
 Source: Government of Mauritius (2013) Public Sector Investment Program 
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the government wishes enhance the transport, energy, communications and water sectors’ 
infrastructure, thereby improving overall productivity. 
There are two key questions that need to be answered in investigating the role of these 
different types of infrastructure in enhancing the growth of the Mauritian economy.  First, what 
are the efficiency enhancing property of different types of public infrastructure on different 
sectors of the economy?  One would not necessarily expect that increased provision of a 
particular type of infrastructure would have uniform impacts across the economy.  Second,  if 
infrastructure does, indeed, enhance productivity, what is the optimal level of infrastructure 
spending?   
III. A General Equilibrium Specification 
 In this section we develop the formal structure of a dynamic general equilibrium model 
that endogenously generates an underground economy.  At the same time the model will permit 
the incorporation and analysis of productive public infrastructure. In addition, much of the 
structure of our model is designed to permit numerical implementation for Egypt and Mauritius. 
Our model has n discrete time periods. All agents optimize in each period over a 2 period time 
horizon. That is, in period t  they optimize given prices for periods t  and 1t  and expectations 
for prices for the future after 1t  . When period 2t   arrives, agents reoptimize for period 2t   
and 3t  , based on new information about period 2t  .  
Production 
There are 8 factors of production and 3 types of financial assets: 
1-5 Capital types  9.  Domestic currency 
6. Urban labor 10.  Bank deposits 
7. Rural labor 11.  Foreign currency 
8. Land 
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The five types of capital correspond to five aggregate nonagricultural productive sectors.  An 
input-output matrix, At, is used to determine intermediate and final production in period t. In 
practice, matrix is 27 x 27 for each country.  The first 26 rows and columns of the input-output 
matrix correspond to domestic production.  The final row and column represents imports of 
intermediate goods, which are treated as a single aggregate commodity.  Corresponding to each 
sector in the input-output matrix, sector-specific value added is produced using capital and urban 
labor for the nonagricultural sectors, and land and rural labor in agriculture.  
The specific formulation of the firm's problem is as follows. Let j
Kiy ,
j
Liy be the inputs of 
capital and urban labor to the jth nonagricultural sector in period i. Let GiY be the outstanding 
stock of government infrastructure in period i. The production of value added in sector j in 
period i is then given by: 
 ( , , ) 
j j
ji ji Ki Li Giva va y y Y   (1) 
where we suppose that public infrastructure may act as a productivity increment to private 
production.   
Sector j pays income taxes on inputs of capital and labor, given by ,  Kij Lijt t  respectively, in 
period i. The interpretation of these taxes is that the capital tax is a tax on firm profits, while the 
labor tax is a personal income tax that is withheld at source.  It should be noted that the capital 
tax is equivalent to the standard formulation of the corporate income tax in economic models.  
The tax is not levied upon the stock of corporate capital, but on the returns to that capital, which 
is sector specific.  There are no pure profits here, since production functions are constant returns 
to scale, and hence the corporate income tax is treated as a tax on returns to capital.  
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We suppose that each type of sectoral capital is produced via a sector-specific investment 
technology that uses inputs of capital and labor to produce new capital. Investment is carried out 
by the private sector and is entirely financed by domestic borrowing  
Let us define the following notation: 
HiC   = The cost of producing the quantity H of capital of a particular type in period i.  
ir      = The interest rate in period i. 
KiP  = The return to capital in period i. 
MiP   = The price of money in period i.  
i  = The rate of depreciation of capital. 
Suppose, then, that the rental price of capital in period 1 is 1P . If 1HC  is the cost-minimizing 
cost of producing the quantity of capital, 1H , then the cost of borrowing must equal the present 
value of the return on new capital. Hence: 
 
2
1
1 1
2
1
(1 )
(1 )
in
Ki
H i
i
j
j
P H
C
r
 



 
 

 
 
 
 


    (2) 
where    is the interest rate in period j, given by: 
 1/j Bjr P  
where    is the price of a bond in period j. The tax on capital is implicitly included in the 
investment problem, as capital taxes are paid on capital as an input to production.  
The to invest depends not only on the variables in the above equation, but also upon the 
decision the firm makes as to whether it should pay taxes. This decision determines the firm’s 
entry into the underground economy. We assume that the firm’s decision is based upon a 
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comparison of the tax rate on capital with the rate of return on new capital. Formally, suppose 
that we were in a two period world. Suppose that: 
 2
1
11
K
K
P
t
r


 
that is, the present value of the return on one unit of new capital is greater than the current tax 
rate on capital. In this case we assume the investor pays the full tax rate on capital inputs. 
Suppose, on the other hand, that: 
 2
1
11
K
K
P
t
r


 
Here the discounted rate of return is less than the tax rate. The extent to which the firm goes 
into the underground economy is determined by the gap between the tax rate and the rate of 
return to investment. That is, the firm pays a tax rate of 1Kt  where: 
 
2
1
2
1 1
1
1
1
K
K
K K
K
P
t
r
t t
t

  
  
   
  
  
  
 (3) 
Here 0    and higher values of   lead to lower values of taxes actually paid. That is, the 
ratio 1
1
K
K
t
t
 reflects the share of the sector that operates in the above ground economy.  Hence   
represents a firm-specific behavioral variable. An “honest” firm would set 0  , while a firm 
that is prone to evasion would have a high value for  .  
We should note that a firm’s decision to evade taxes is based upon a comparison of the 
marginal return to capital with the tax rate.
7
  Hence a firm may be quite capital intensive, i.e., 
                                                          
7
 In the presence of corruption in tax administration, the effective tax rate takes into account 
evasion and bribes. The firms will compare marginal return to capital with effective tax rate in 
the presence of corruption.  
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have a large stock of existing capital, yet have a low marginal return to new capital and hence be 
predisposed to evading taxes.  Thus, for example, an “old” industrial firm might be a tax evader, 
while being relatively capital intensive.  A service sector firm, while being relatively labor 
intensive, might have a high marginal rate of return to new capital and hence not wish to evade 
taxes. Thus simply looking at relative capital intensities will not allow us to predict the degrees 
of tax evasions different firms will choose.  It is, however, the case that evasion in our model is 
driven by a focus on the capital income tax and firms’ optimizing their avoidance of payments of 
that tax.  If, for example, we also incorporated evasion of other taxes, for example, payments of 
the personal income tax, then this might alter the extent to which the service sector dominates tax 
evasion.  The service sector, which sees little benefit in paying the capital income tax, tends to 
evade it, while manufacturing tends to pay it, given their need to invest.   
Banking 
     We will suppose that there is one bank for each nonagricultural sector of the economy. There 
are 5 such sectors, and hence 5 banks, corresponding to each of the aggregate capital stocks. 
Each bank lends primarily to the sector with which it is associated. The banks are, however, not 
fully specialized in the sector they correspond to. We make the simplifying assumption that each 
bank holds a fixed share of the outstanding debt of its particular sector. It then holds additional 
fixed shares of the debt of each of the remaining sectors.  We make this assumption of 
diversification of assets in order to allow for a situation in which a firm that evades taxes, and 
thereby enters the underground economy, might receive varying degrees of credit rationing from 
the different banks to which it applies for loans. 
Our premise is that banks have no direct way of knowing whether specific firms operate in 
the underground economy. We assume that banks only care about the amount of capital that they 
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estimate the firm may have. If the firm defaults on its loan, then this represents the best estimate 
of the amount that the bank could seize. The bank would, presumably, be willing to lend an 
amount equal to at least the estimated firm capital.  
We assume the borrower is required to show the bank his tax returns in order to obtain a 
loan. There is a single, flat corporate tax rate that the borrowing firm faces. Hence, suppose that 
1KT  represents taxes actually paid by the borrower in period 1. This is known to the bank, as the 
potential borrower is required to present his tax returns. Thus if the borrower fully complied with 
his tax obligation, and hence carried out no underground activity, the value of his capital, 1Kˆ  , 
would be given by: 
 1
1
1
ˆ K
K
T
K
t
  
In this case the bank lends an amount 1L , where 1 1HL C , as the bank would not be able to 
seize the full value of the loan in the case of a default. The situation we have described would, in 
the case of perfect certainty, have credit rationing when the estimated value of the firm’s capital 
is less than its loan request. If the firm’s capital is greater than its loan request, there would be no 
credit rationing. 
In a more realistic case of uncertainty about both the true value of the firm, as well as about 
the bank’s own ability to seize the firm, one might expect the lending process to be somewhat 
different. Accordingly, we will suppose that a simple functional form determines bank lending as 
a function of the amount requested as well as the estimated value of the firm’s capital. We define 
the amount the bank lends, 1L , as: 
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  (4) 
Here  represents a measure of risk aversion by the bank. If 0  , there are no credit 
restrictions, and the bank ignores estimates of the borrower’s estimated net worth.  As   rises, 
the bank increasingly restricts lending if the term in brackets is less than 1. Thus if a firm 
operates entirely in the underground economy it will not be able to borrow to finance investment. 
If banks are highly risk averse, they will never lend more than a firm’s estimated net worth, 
which is based on its tax return. This tax return therefore represents all the information the bank 
needs in order to determine its response to a request for a loan. 
Consumption 
 There are two types of consumers, representing rural and urban labor. We suppose that 
the two consumer classes have differing Cobb-Douglas demands and endowments. The 
consumers maximize intertemporal utility functions, which have as arguments the levels of 
consumption and leisure in each of the two periods.  
Formally, the consumer’s problem is then given by equation 5.8  The definition of the 
notation follows. 
Max 1 1 1 2 2 2( ),   ( , , , , , )Lu Lr Lu LrU x x x x x x x x       (5) 
such that: 
(1 )i i i Lui Lui Lri Lri Mi Mi Bi Bi i Bfi Bfi it Px P x p x P x P x e P x C              (5a) 
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1K A Lu u Lr r M B BF FP K P A P L P L P M r B P B e P B TR N          
                                                          
8
 See Feltenstein and Shamloo (2012) for a discussion of this modeling approach. 
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2 0 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2(1 )K A Lu u Lr r M M B BF BFP K P A P L P L P x r x e P x TR N          
 i iC N  
1log log (log log )iBi Bi i BFi BFi i Fi
i
e
P x e P x r r
e
           (5b) 
1 2log( / ) log
Lui Lri
ui ri
Lui Lri
P P
L L a a
P P

 

       (5c) 
log log(1 )Mi Mi i i iP x a b t Px           (5d)    
2 2
2 2 0 1 2 2 2 2
2
(1 )
1
B B
r
P x d d t P x d


 
     
 
       (5e)    
where:  
Pi  = price vector of consumption goods in period i. 
xi  = vector of consumption in period i. 
Ci = value of aggregate consumption in period i (including purchases of financial assets). 
Ni = aggregate income in period i (including potential income from the sale of real and 
financial assets). 
ti = vector of value added tax rates in period i. 
PLui = price of urban labor in period i. 
Lui = allocation of total labor to urban labor in period i. 
xLui = demand for urban leisure in period i. 
PLri = price of rural labor in period i. 
Lri = allocation of total labor to rural labor in period i. 
xLri = demand for rural leisure in period i. 
a2 = elasticity of rural/urban migration. 
PKi = price of capital in period i. 
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K0 = initial holding of capital. 
PAi = price of land in period i. 
A0 = initial holding of land. 
δ = rate of depreciation of capital. 
PMi = price of money in period i. Money in period 1 is the numeraire.  
xMi = holdings of money in period i. 
PBi = discount price of a certificate of deposit in period i. 
πi = domestic rate of inflation in period i. 
,i Fir r = the domestic and foreign interest rates in period i. 
xBi = quantity of bank deposits, that is, CD's in period i. 
ei = the exchange rate in terms of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency in 
period i. 
xBFi = quantity of foreign currency held in period i. 
TRi = transfer payments from the government in period i. 
a, b, ,     = estimated constants. 
id  = constants estimated from model simulations. 
The Government 
 The government collects personal income, corporate profit, and value-added taxes, as 
well as import duties. It pays for the production of infrastructure (capital expenditure), wages and 
spending on goods and services (current expenditure), public goods, as well as for subsidies. In 
addition, the government must cover both domestic and foreign interest obligations on public 
debt. The resulting deficit is financed by a combination of monetary expansion, as well as 
domestic and foreign borrowing  
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The Foreign Sector 
 The foreign sector is represented by a simple export equation in which aggregate demand 
for exports is determined by domestic and foreign price indices, as well as world income. The 
specific form of the export equation is: 
 10 1 2n wi
i Fi
X y
e

 

 
    
  
 
where the left-hand side of the equation represents the change in the dollar value of exports in 
period i, πi is inflation in the domestic price index,  ie is the percentage change in the exchange 
rate, and Fi is the foreign rate of inflation. Also, wiy represents the percentage change in world 
income, denominated in dollars. Finally, σ1 and σ2 are corresponding elasticities.  
 Imports are treated as a single aggregate good produced by the foreign sector.  
Consumption demand for imports is determined as part of the consumer’s demand given by 
equation (5), in which consumers have an elasticity of demand for imported goods.  Thus 
imports are both intermediate and final goods, with intermediate demand being generated by the 
input-output matrix and final demand coming from consumer optimization. 
IV. Mauritius:  Infrastructure Estimation 
Model Specification 
 
We assume that cost of production depends on input prices and infrastructure stock. The 
cost function of the k
th
 sector can be written as                        where, w is labor’s 
return or wage rate,  r is capital’s return or interest rate,     is sectoral output,    is the public 
electricity infrastructure stock,    is the private electricity infrastructure stock,    is the public 
transportation and communication infrastructure stock, and    is the private transportation and 
communication infrastructure stock.    is twice continuously differentiable and has other 
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standard properties of cost functions. As discussed by Christensen, Jorgenson, & Lau (1973), and 
Berndt & Wood (1975) it can be written in following trans-log form: 
 
         ∑           ∑   ∑            (  )  
 
 
∑          
              
 
Differentiating (6) with respect to  ln (w) and ln (r), and using Shephard’s lemma we get: 
 
  
 
 
                            (  )                   (  )
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Where Xl and Xk are labor and capital input demands respectively. Dividing (7) by (8) and after 
further simplification we get: 
 
                              (  )                 (  )                
 
Where,  
 
    
[               ]
[             ]
 and     
[               ]
[             ]
 
 
are elasticities for public electricity and water supply infrastructure, and public transportation 
and communication infrastructure respectively. 
Equation (9) can be estimated by the following equation: 
 
                                (  )      
          (  ) 
                     
 
Data 
 
In our estimation we assume sector specific wage rates and a single interest rate for all 
industry groups. Our measure of interest is the annual bank rate of Mauritius which is simple 
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average of weighted average yield per annum of 91-day, 182-day, 273-day, and 364-day 
Government of Mauritius Treasury Bills. We obtain data for 1999 to 2013 from the Monthly 
Statistical Bulletin of the Bank of Mauritius, various issues. For 1987 to 1998, we use end of 
period (December) bank rate reported by Jankee (1999). Our measure of wage rate is the average 
monthly earnings by industrial groups computed from the Survey of Employment and Earnings 
in Large (employing 10 or more) Establishments by Statistics Mauritius. We obtain wage data 
for 1987 to 1990 from IMF (1996); and for rest of the period, data are obtained from Labor Force 
Historical Series of Statistics Mauritius. Average monthly earnings are reported for more 
disaggregated industry groups since 2000. Therefore, we calculate the weighted average of 
monthly earnings, weighted by sectoral employment in large establishments, to obtain wage rates 
for our aggregated industry groups. Nominal wages are then deflated by annual Consumer Price 
Index to obtain real wages in constant 2006 prices.  
 
Capital Stock Calculation 
 
We use the following perpetual inventory method to calculate capital stock: 
 
                            
 
Where,    is the capital stock available at the beginning of period t, δ is the rate of depreciation, 
and     is the gross fixed capital formation in period t – 1. Repeated substitution of      in 
equation (6) yields: 
 
   ∑      
                   
 
     
 
Equation (12) suggests that capital stock data can be calculated from gross fixed capital 
formation data if the initial capital stock   is known. Harberger (1978) suggests using steady 
state conditions from neo-classical growth literature to figure out initial capital stock. Since 
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growth rate of capital equals growth rate of output in steady state,    can be calculated from the 
following formula: 
 
   
  
      
          
 
Harberger further suggests using three year average investment and three year average 
GNP growth rate to eliminate short run fluctuations. Vikram & Dhareshwar (1993) propose an 
alternative econometric approach for calculating   . They run a linear regression of log of 
investment over time, and use first period fitted value as   . In our calculation we employ both 
average and fitted values as appropriate for different industry groups depending on data. In a 
special case for initial capital stock of mining we use a slightly different approach since gross 
fixed capital formation in mining industry was near zero for a certain period of time. We use 
gross operating surplus of mining industry in first available year to calculate capital stock of 
mining industry in that year, and then iterate backward using equation (12) to get the initial 
capital stock. We assume a constant depreciation rate of 5% for all industries. 
Gross domestic fixed capital formation data are collected from the National Accounts 
Historical Series of Statistics Mauritius. We compile four different national accounts series from 
1976 to 1998, 1990 to 2002, 1999 to 2010, and 2006 to 2013 to get a time series of public and 
private gross fixed capital formation from 1987 to 2013. Since national accounting standards has 
evolved over time and more recent data are reported at more disaggregated level, it is difficult to 
generate a uniform time series data. For our purpose we aggregate sectors in ten broad industry 
categories. Details of sectoral aggregation are presented in Table 2a while Table 2b gives macro 
aggregates for Mauritius. 
We first calculate total capital stock series for different industries using total gross 
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domestic fixed capital formation data, and separately calculate private capital stocks for industry 
groups using gross domestic private fixed capital formation data. We then subtract private capital 
stocks from total capital stocks to generate public capital stock series for different industry 
groups. 
 
  
 
Chart – 1 and Chart – 2 show electricity, gas, and water supply capital stocks, and 
transportation, communication, and storage capital stock respectively from 1987 to 2013. The 
charts demonstrate that the major shares of electricity and transportation infrastructure stocks in 
Mauritius belong to the public sector. 
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Table 2a. Aggregation of Industrial Sectors 
 
1987-1991 1992-2005 2006-2013 
1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry 
and fishing 
1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry and 
fishing 
1. Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
2. Mining and quarrying 2. Mining and quarrying 2. Mining and quarrying 
3. Manufacturing 3. Manufacturing 3. Manufacturing 
4. Electricity , gas  and  water 
supply 
4. Electricity , gas  and  water supply 4. Electricity, gas, steam and  air conditioning 
supply 
5. Water supply, sewerage, waste management 
and remediation 
5. Construction 5. Construction 6. Construction 
6. Wholesale & retail trade, 
restaurants & hotels 
6. Wholesale & retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles, motorcycles, 
personal and household goods 
7. Wholesale & retail trade and repairs 
7. Hotels and restaurants  8. Accommodation and food service activities 
7. Transport , storage and 
communications  
8. Transport , storage and 
communications 
9. Transportation and storage  
10. Information and communication 
8. Financing, insurance, real estate 
and business 
9. Financial intermediation 11. Financial intermediation 
10. Real estate, renting and business 
activities 
12. Real estate activities  
9. Producers of Government 
services 
11. Public administration and defense; 
compulsory social security                                                     
13. Public administration and defense; 
compulsory social security 
10. Other services 12. Education 14. Education 
13. Health and social work 15. Human health and social work activities 
14. Other  community, social and 
personal service activities and 
private households with employed 
persons 
16. Professional, scientific and technical 
activities 
17. Administrative and support service activities                                                   
18. Arts, entertainment and recreation 
19. Other service activities 
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Table 2b – Mauritius Economy 
Year 
Real 
GDP 
Growth GDFCF 
Public 
GDFCF Revenue 
Budget 
Deficit 
Foreign 
Financing 
(Net) 
Domestic 
Financing 
(Net) 
  
(% of 
GDP) 
(% of 
GDP) 
(% of 
GDP) 
(% of 
GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP) 
2000 7.30 22.54 6.31 19.20 -3.52 -0.42 3.94 
2001 2.56 22.31 6.94 16.97 -6.16 -2.67 8.83 
2002 1.14 21.42 6.74 17.43 -5.73 0.68 12.68 
2003 5.71 22.49 8.62 18.67 -5.69 0.15 5.54 
2004 4.14 21.71 6.52 18.61 -4.91 -0.27 5.18 
2005 1.36 21.48 6.22 18.84 -4.72 0.25 4.46 
2006 4.50 24.22 7.52 18.37 -4.85 -0.54 5.38 
2007 5.89 25.10 5.37 17.28 -3.87 1.83 2.04 
2008 5.49 24.62 4.14 19.40 -2.52 -0.09 3.12 
2009 3.07 26.36 6.60 22.03 -2.99 1.24 2.35 
2010 4.04 24.87 6.10 21.89 -3.20 1.82 1.57 
2011 3.95 24.02 5.54 21.43 -3.20 1.72 2.41 
2012 3.14 23.02 5.53 21.45 -1.77 0.87 1.31 
2013 3.20 21.02 5.01 21.35 -3.50 2.95 1.99 
Source: Authors’ calculation from Statistics Mauritius Data 
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Estimation 
 
We estimate equation (10) for different industry groups. However, we first need to check 
time series properties of the data to avoid spurious regression. For meaningful estimation, it 
requires time series data to be stationary or variables to be cointegrated. We performed 
Augmented Dickey – Fuller test and Pillips – Perron test to investigate the presence of a unit 
root. Lag lengths are determined using Akaike and Schwartz information criterions. Results of 
unit root tests are presented in Table 3. It turns out that except for agricultural GDP, construction 
wages, and other services wages, all other variables contain a unit root, and hence are not 
stationary. We, therefore, need to examine whether the variables are cointegrated. We performed 
Johansen cointegration test for the variables listed in equation (9) and found at least one 
cointegrating relationship for each industry group. Results of the cointegration tests suggest that 
estimates of equation (10) can be treated as long run relationships between respective variables. 
However, the estimation for the agricultural sector is not valid since the order of integration for 
independent and dependent variables are different. 
 
We also need to take care of serial correlation in our regression. We performed Durbin – 
Watson and Breusch–Godfrey tests to check for serial correlation. It appears that we have serial 
correlation problems for the mining, manufacturing, wholesale & trade sectors. We use a Prais –
Winsten regression for these industry groups. Estimation results of equation (10) are presented in 
Table 4. 
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Table 3. Augmented Dickey Fuller and Phillips-Perron Test Statistics for Unit Root Test 
 
Variables Lags 
Level First Difference 
I(.) 
No Trend Trend No Trend Trend 
ADF PP  ADF PP  ADF  PP ADF  PP  
ln (Qagri) 0 -3.45** -18.439*** -5.437*** -28.727*** -6.736*** -33.05*** -6.619*** -33.194*** I(0) 
ln (Qmining) 2 -0.422 -0.109 -2.272 -3.883 -1.959 -11.249* -2.08 -14.885 I(1) 
ln (Qmanuf) 1 -2.732* -1.776 -1.345 -2.396 -2.081 -14.996** -2.842 -23.881*** I(1) 
ln (Qconst) 2 -1.72 -1.92 -2.091 -9.153 -1.993* -10.966* -2.385 -14.37 I(1) 
ln (Qtrade) 1 -1.853 -1.017 -1.133 -4.955 -3.238** -15.969** -4.254** -20.899** I(1) 
ln (Qfinance) 1 -0.784 -0.163 -1.772 -10.269 -5.076*** -28.174*** -5.187*** -28.216*** I(1) 
ln (Qother) 2 -1.727 -0.336 -3.542* -5.597 -2.715* -15.003** -3.211 -17.339* I(1) 
ln (wagri) 1 -0.101 -0.529 -2.159 -9.499 -3.775*** -27.099*** -3.732** -27.082*** I(1) 
ln (wmining) 1 -1.901 -6.258 -2.022 -5.747 -2.477 -24.563*** -3.283* -27.991*** I(1) 
ln (wmanuf) 1 -0.406 -2.298 -3.032 -10.932 -3.564** -27.873*** -3.973** -28.398*** I(1) 
ln (wconst) 1 -0.748 -2.885 -4.464*** -21.699** -7.493*** -22.87*** -7.422*** -22.749*** I(0) 
ln (wtrade) 1 -1.777 -2.853 -1.741 -8.782 -3.935*** -28.349*** -4.368** -29.691*** I(1) 
ln (wfinance) 3 1.273 1.884 -2.063 -6.663 -0.334 -33.522*** -0.402 -35.882*** I(1) 
ln (wother) 3 -0.596 -0.892 -2.179 -23.636*** -4.341* -29.059*** -4.227** -29.046*** I(0) 
ln (r)  1 -0.267 -1.969 -1.797 -10.362 -4.011*** -28.366*** -4.271** -29.68*** I(1) 
ln (Epub) 1 -0.842 -0.848 -2.053 -5.286 -2.275 -16.734** -2.123 -16.712* I(1) 
ln (Tpub) 1 -1.44 -2.461 -1.655 -12.88 -2.999* -31.144*** -2.959 -31.457*** I(1) 
ln (Epvt) 1 -1.699 -1.889 -1.553 -4.313 -2.805* -18.118*** -2.943 -19.247** I(1) 
ln (Tpvt) 1 -0.524 0.013 -2.994 -13.577 -3.861*** -27.678*** -3.8** -27.544*** I(1) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0
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Results 
 
Results show that there is economically and statistically significant relationship between 
sectoral output and public infrastructure. Outputs of manufacturing, wholesale & trade, financial 
services, and other services are positively related with public electricity infrastructure stock. 
Similarly, the public transportation and communication capital stock has statistically significant 
positive effects on construction, financial services, and other services. Based on these estimation 
results, we may conclude that economic growth in Mauritius is positively associated with public 
infrastructure facilities. 
 
Table 4. Serial Correlation Corrected Infrastructure Elasticities 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Agri. Mining Manuf. Constr. Trade Finance Other 
        
Log Wage 0.268 -0.143 0.135 -0.121 0.111 -0.0455 0.0927 
 (0.284) (0.199) (0.229) (0.220) (0.178) (0.113) (0.102) 
Log Interest Rate -0.0627 0.0963 0.0173 0.0614 0.0383 -0.0176 -0.00185 
 (0.0676) (0.129) (0.0274) (0.0460) (0.0275) (0.0400) (0.0222) 
Log Public Electricity 0.193 0.536 0.784** -0.0991 0.677** 0.537* 0.344* 
 (0.710) (1.472) (0.277) (0.401) (0.285) (0.300) (0.193) 
Log Public  0.886 -1.094 0.548 2.393*** 0.553 1.243** 0.650** 
Transportation (0.946) (1.678) (0.345) (0.618) (0.358) (0.502) (0.294) 
Log Private Electricity -0.0412 0.0305 0.0109 -0.0178 -0.00116 0.00954 -0.00808 
 (0.0343) (0.0672) (0.0144) (0.0253) (0.0145) (0.0195) (0.0121) 
Log Private  -0.0773 -1.658 0.376 1.761*** 1.254*** 1.901*** 1.867*** 
Transportation (0.302) (1.116) (0.254) (0.278) (0.201) (0.193) (0.136) 
Constant -4.135 31.52 -9.087 -33.67*** -16.75*** -28.21*** -20.93*** 
 (15.37) (27.19) (5.426) (9.722) (5.530) (7.546) (4.636) 
        
Observations 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.549 0.947 0.999 0.986 0.999 0.995 0.997 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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V. General Equilibrium Policy Simulations 
 
Egypt 
 There are three simulations done which we refer to as: baseline, revolution, and 
revolution with tax cut.  The model is calibrated to the Egyptian economic data for the years 
2008, the year of the SAM, to 2010, the year for the national accounts, and using some new data 
from 2011 and onward regarding tax changes.  The baseline model includes no exogenous 
shocks or alternative policies implemented.  The revolution simulation includes a 70% decrease 
in the foreign demand for those industries that were hit hardest by the revolution: tourism, 
transportation, hotels and restaurants, as well as trade and finance.  This shock is conducted for a 
single time period to isolate the effect of the foreign trade aspect of the revolution in that year 
and on the long term growth path.  The final simulation, revolution with tax cut, is identical to 
the revolution treatment except the corporate income tax is reduced by 25% for the duration of 
the model to study the effects of the revolution on the economy with an alternative fiscal policy 
that encourages higher tax compliance. 
 Results 
 In analyzing these results we look at the macroeconomic effects on the economy and the 
government’s budget, the effects on consumers’ utility and income, and the effects on the 
sectors’ participation in the formal economy.  
A Gross Domestic Product 
 Regarding the growth rate, in Figure 1 we find that our model, absent the revolution, 
predicts a return to the robust growth rates seen in the 2005-2010 time period when our SAM 
was built.  However, Figures 1 and 2 reveal that with the revolution the real GDP growth rate is 
4.3% less than the baseline in the absence of the lower tax on capital.  With the lower corporate 
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income tax rate, we see a 3% net decrease from the higher growth path.  The long term effect on 
GDP of the one year shock is to diminish real GDP by 3.25% five years after the revolution.  The 
effect on GDP is diminished though a more robust growth path in the presence of a tax cut on 
corporations.   
 
Figure 1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Baseline 4.15% 2.38% 10.42% 8.84% 8.09% 9.07% 5.21%
Revolution 4.15% -1.88% 10.56% 8.62% 8.40% 9.40% 5.67%
Revolution and Tax Cut 4.01% -0.61% 10.05% 9.76% 8.00% 9.49% 5.61%
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Figure 2 
 
 
B Inflation 
 Regarding inflation, our simulation results again show a return to the high inflation found 
from 2008-10 during the time our data was extracted, when inflation averaged 13.6%.  Our 
baseline inflation rate averages 10.9% in the baseline and ranges from 5% to 17.4%.  Inflation 
for the revolution simulation is lower over the simulation with an average of 10.6% while the 
final treatment including the tax cut has an average inflation rate of 11.5%.   Figure 3 reveals the 
increasing inflation and the effect the effect of the revolution and tax cut on it over the duration 
of the simulation. 
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Figure 3 
 
C Budget 
 Figure 4 shows that the revolution has a negligible effect on the tax collections as a 
percent of GDP though they are slightly lower as a result of lower tax revenues on those sectors 
impacted by the revolution, but this effect is offset by the diminished economy in that 
simulation.  As we would expect, the lower tax rate on corporations does diminish tax revenue as 
a percentage of the overall economy.  However, the decrease in revenue is not the absolute 
amount that a static analysis would reveal, as additional firms enter the formal economy and 
begin paying taxes on their capital in order to access capital markets.  Figure 4 also shows that 
the model predicts a slight increase in the tax to GDP revenue from approximately 19% to a bit 
less than 21%.   
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Baseline 4.95% 5.10% 9.79% 11.68% 12.43% 15.75% 17.39%
Revolution 4.95% 5.74% 9.71% 10.85% 12.50% 16.71% 14.90%
Revolution and Tax Cut 5.32% 6.67% 9.87% 12.71% 12.58% 18.45% 15.18%
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Figure 4 
 
 
Regarding deficits, we see that the government is running increasingly large deficits into 
the future.  The problem of the deficit is exacerbated by the revolution and further compounded 
by the tax cut.   
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Baseline 18.9% 19.8% 19.8% 19.9% 20.3% 20.4% 20.8% 20.9%
Revolution 18.9% 19.8% 19.9% 20.0% 20.3% 20.5% 20.8% 20.9%
Revolution and Tax Cut 17.6% 18.5% 18.8% 18.8% 19.1% 19.1% 19.4% 19.5%
17.0%
18.0%
19.0%
20.0%
21.0%
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Figure 5 
 
 
D Consumers 
 In Table 3 we see the real incomes of the ten consumer groups in period 8.  Consumers 1-
5 are urban, consumers 6-10 are rural, and the quintiles are increasing so the poorest quintiles are 
1 and 6.  The first thing to note is that the urban consumers are considerably wealthier than their 
rural counterparts. In fact, all but the poorest urban quintile are richer than the richest rural 
quintile.  We also see the effects of the simulated revolution hit the urban consumers especially 
hard while the rural consumers are slightly helped. This result occurs because the diminished 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Baseline -5.50% -4.60% -15.40% -14.20% -21.40% -21.70% -24.40% -27.30%
Revolution -5.50% -4.60% -15.90% -15.10% -22.90% -23.50% -25.90% -28.50%
Revolution and Tax Cut -6.90% -6.10% -17.00% -16.60% -23.90% -25.00% -27.90% -30.70%
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foreign demand hits urban labor, provided by urban consumers, almost exclusively. The result of 
the diminished demand for goods produced using urban labor is a diminished relative urban 
wage.  We also see in the results that the increased growth provided by the lower tax rate on 
capital brings urban consumers back to the baseline while increasing the gains by rural 
consumers. 
Table –2: Real income in period 8 by consumer  
 
Baseline Revolution Revolution with Tax Cut 
 
Income Income % Change Income % Change 
Urban      
Consumer 1 14.6 13.8 -5.33% 14.6 -0.02% 
Consumer 2 21.3 20.1 -5.36% 21.3 -0.04% 
Consumer 3 26.5 25.2 -5.23% 26.6 0.09% 
Consumer 4 35.2 33.5 -4.92% 35.4 0.40% 
Consumer 5 76.6 74.3 -3.03% 78.3 2.26% 
Rural      
Consumer 6 3.5 3.9 13.34% 4.1 18.38% 
Consumer 7 4.9 5.5 12.30% 5.8 17.37% 
Consumer 8 6.1 6.8 11.96% 7.1 17.01% 
Consumer 9 7.6 8.5 11.63% 8.9 16.69% 
Consumer 10 19.6 21.3 8.36% 22.2 13.00% 
 
In Table 3 we see the utility values in period 8 relative to the baseline which is 
normalized to 100.  Again, we see in the revolution simulation that the rural consumers gain 
from the increased relative wage rate and the urban consumers suffer.  However, with the 
inclusion of the tax cuts, the losses for the urban consumers are largely diminished or reversed 
while the rural consumers have their gains increased.   
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Table—3: Utility in period 8 by consumer 
 
Baseline Revolution Revolution with Tax Cut 
Consumer Utility Utility %  Change Utility %  Change 
Urban 
     Consumer 1 100.0 88.8 -11.2% 95.2 -4.8% 
Consumer 2 100.0 92.3 -7.7% 98.5 -1.5% 
Consumer 3 100.0 93.8 -6.2% 99.9 -0.1% 
Consumer 4 100.0 95.0 -5.0% 101.0 1.0% 
Consumer 5 100.0 98.9 -1.1% 104.7 4.7% 
Rural 
     Consumer 6 100.0 121.2 21.2% 127.3 27.3% 
Consumer 7 100.0 120.8 20.8% 126.7 26.7% 
Consumer 8 100.0 121.6 21.6% 127.3 27.3% 
Consumer 9 100.0 121.9 21.9% 127.6 27.6% 
Consumer 10 100.0 116.3 16.3% 120.9 20.9% 
 
 
E Formal Sector 
 Our final variable of interest is the level to which sectors are entering or leaving the 
formal sector of the economy.  Figures 6 and 7 show the percent of each capital sector which is 
participating in the formal economy relative to the baseline for the two alternative treatments.  In 
Figure 6 we see that Heavy Industry and Electricity, Water, and Sewage decrease their level of 
compliance and thus operate in the informal sector at a greater rate as a result of the revolution.  
The other industries are not affected. 
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Figure 6 
 
 
 Figure 7 shows the effect on participation in the formal economy of the capital sectors 
relative to the baseline in the final treatment.  Here we see that the decreased tax on capital has 
an unambiguously positive impact, despite the revolution, on participation in the formal 
economy as all capital sectors operate in the formal sector at an equal or greater rate. This is as 
theory would predict, given that the lower tax rate increases the return to capital and thus makes 
borrowing capital more attractive and thus paying taxes to verify assets more attractive.  Also of 
note is that transportation and light manufacturing are not effected in either simulation.   
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Figure 7 
 
 In conclusion, we see that reducing tax evasion by lowering the corporate tax rate has 
positive benefits for Egypt, although the resulting growth increase will not fully compensate for 
the loss in tourism. 
Mauritius 
In order to analyze growth in Mauritius, we have parameterized the same general 
equilibrium model as used for Egypt.  Our policy focus here is on the role of infrastructure in 
enhancing growth, rather than on tax policy and tax evasion, as was the case with Egypt.  The 
implementation of our model is based upon several data sources for Mauritius, in particular an 
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input-output matrix and a social accounting matrix (SAM), both representing 2007.  These and 
other data sources are given in the bibliography.   
After calibrating our model to the 8 year period 2005-2012, we run a series of forward 
looking simulations for the years 2012-2019.  In the first of these, all public policy parameter, 
such as tax rates, current public expenditure, proportions of the budget deficit financed by debt 
and monetization, and all transfer payments, are assumed to remain constant.  In addition, we 
will assume the country maintains a fixed exchange rate with the rate fixed at the level of 2012.  
In particular, we will assume that the level of public capital expenditure is kept at 0 for each of 
the 8 years of the simulation.  This simulation will represent a benchmark, or base case, to be 
used for comparisons with alternative scenarios about public capital spending.  It should not be 
viewed as having any predictive indications for the future.  The results of this benchmark 
simulation are given in Table 1M. 
          
TABLE 1M: BASE CASE  YEAR 
       (based on 2012) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
REAL GDP 1/ 100.0 108.1 111.7 115.8 124.0 125.9 130.6 131.5 
NOMINAL GDP 1/ 100.0 133.8 188.2 245.6 350.8 452.1 598.0 764.4 
PRICE LEVEL 1/ 100.0 123.7 168.6 212.1 283.0 359.0 458.0 581.4 
TAX REVENUES 2/ 17.3 18.6 19.6 19.8 19.8 20.1 20.2 20.4 
GOV. EXPENDITURES 2/ 24.4 27.2 35.0 35.7 35.0 35.9 37.1 37.8 
GOV. DEFICIT 2/ -7.1 -8.7 -15.5 -15.9 -15.2 -15.9 -16.9 -17.5 
INTEREST RATE 27.3 16.3 11.2 10.3 8.6 9.1 7.0 7.2 
EXPORTS 2/ 35.3 21.4 26.7 24.5 21.6 20.0 19.2 17.9 
IMPORTS 2/ 34.1 34.8 31.7 30.5 27.6 27.0 25.7 25.4 
TRADE DEFICIT 2/ 1.2 -13.4 -5.0 -6.0 -6.0 -7.0 -6.5 -7.5 
 1/ Index numbers based upon year 1 
 2/ As percent of GDP 
 
             
We notice that average annual real growth is about 4.0 percent, which is approximately 
the rate for the period prior to 2012, the base year of our simulation.  Tax revenues are 
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essentially constant as a share of GDP, while expenditures grow as the interest obligations on the 
debt burden grow.  We should note that tax revenues here do not include other sources of 
revenues, so that our measure of the budget deficit is larger than historical measures. The interest 
rate eventually stabilizes at about 7.0 percent, and the trade deficit slowly deteriorates in 
response to the fixed exchange rate. Similarly, real GDP growth stagnates by the final periods, 
partly in response to the fixed exchange rate, but also because of the lack of growth in public 
infrastructure.   
Suppose we now ask to what extent can the real growth rate be increased if the 
government increases infrastructure spending, which was assumed to be 0 in the previous 
example.  The mechanism for such an increase in growth would be through the estimated 
elasticities of private output with respect to public infrastructure, given in Table 4.  In order to 
avoid combining the increase in growth generated by increased private sector productivity with 
the growth generated by a Keynesian spending increase, we will assume that the public 
infrastructure spending increase is compensated for by a corresponding decrease in current 
expenditure.  Of course such current spending cuts might not be politically possible, so we 
should view this as a mechanical exercise designed to isolate the effects of private sector 
efficiency increases from the impact of general public spending increases.  At the same time, we 
might expect that increases in public infrastructure would raise the return to private investment, 
thereby increasing the rate of capital formation in the short run.  In the long run, capital 
deepening and the corresponding decrease in the return to capital may cause investment and 
GDP growth to slow.   
As a first example, we will increase public spending on infrastructure to 10 percent of 
GDP, with a corresponding cut in current expenditure.  We will further assume that the spending 
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increase is allocated uniformly across the different categories of infrastructure.
9
  This example 
would thus be the least inflationary scenario for the country, since there would be no increase in 
deficit spending caused by the increased infrastructure.  We will also be able to differentiate 
between the growth effects of the infrastructure and Keynesian spending effects.  The results of 
this exercise are given in Table 2M. 
TABLE 2M: CAPITAL EXPEND. YEAR 
        = 10%  OF GDP 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
REAL GDP 1/ 
 
102.5 109.7 114.0 118.4 127.0 128.9 133.4 134.1 
NOMINAL GDP 1/  
 
99.0 132.1 185.7 242.4 347.0 446.6 588.9 748.8 
PRICE LEVEL 1/ 
 
96.6 120.4 162.8 204.7 273.3 346.4 441.3 558.4 
TAX REVENUES 2/ 
 
17.3 18.6 19.6 19.8 19.8 20.0 20.2 20.3 
GOV. EXPENDITURES 2/ 
 
24.5 27.4 34.9 35.6 34.9 35.8 37.0 37.8 
GOVERNMENT DEFICIT 2/ 
 
-7.2 -8.8 -15.3 -15.8 -15.1 -15.8 -16.8 -17.5 
INTEREST RATE 
 
26.8 15.9 11.3 10.2 8.5 8.8 6.4 6.5 
EXPORTS 2/ 
 
35.6 32.4 27.3 25.0 22.0 20.4 19.6 18.4 
IMPORTS 2/ 
 
36.8 38.2 37.5 36.5 35.0 34.9 34.9 35.0 
TRADE DEFICIT 2/ 
 
-1.2 -5.8 -10.2 -11.5 -13.0 -14.5 -15.3 -16.6 
 1/ Index numbers based upon year 1 
 2/ As percent of GDP 
We see that there has been a modest increase of about 2.0 percent in period 8 real GDP.  
This corresponds to an average annual increase in GDP of 0.3 percent, as compared to the base 
case of Table 1M.  The budget deficit and real interest rate stay at approximately their levels of 
the base case. On the other hand, the trade deficit increases as imports rise, relative to the base 
case.  Thus we see that an increase in public infrastructure can cause a significant increase in real 
GDP, purely based upon the enhancement of private sector productivity, and not because of any 
direct spending increase. 
                                                          
9
 An alternative would be to have infrastructure allocated according to the relative elasticities of 
public infrastructure with respect to different sectors of the economy, depending upon which 
sectors the government wishes to promote. 
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We now may wish to ask how far we can increase infrastructure spending and continue to 
achieve real GDP growth.  If, for example, an increase in infrastructure spending from 0 percent 
of GDP to 10 percent of GDP, as above, leads to a rise in real GDP, how would increases to 15 
or 20 percent of GDP be?  Rather than giving the complete macro outcomes once again, Table 
3M below summarizes the real GDP outcomes of 4 alternative simulations.  These are the base 
case of 0 public infrastructure spending, then 10, 15 and 20 percent of GDP spending on public 
infrastructure, each with a corresponding reduction in current spending. 
Table 3M: REAL GDP         
PERIOD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Infrastructure spending 1/ 
0  100.0 108.1 111.7 115.8 124.0 125.9 130.6 131.5 
10 102.5 109.7 114.0 118.4 127.0 128.9 133.4 134.1 
15 103.2 110.7 115.3 119.8 128.3 130.5 135.2 136.9 
20  103.8 112.4 116.4 121.1 129.8 132.2 136.7 136.5 
1/ Percent of GDP         
 
We see that real GDP increases as infrastructure spending increases from 0 to 15 percent 
of GDP.  However a further increase in spending to 20 percent of GDP actually leads to a decline 
in real GDP by period 8, even though real GDP remains above the levels achieved with 15 
percent spending for the first 7 time periods.  We see the importance of using a dynamic model 
with many time periods, since looking at only the first few periods would lead us to conclude 
that increasing spending on infrastructure from 15 to 20 percent of GDP will lead to an overall 
increase in real GDP.  In fact, further increases in infrastructure spending beyond 20 percent of 
GDP lead to further declines in real GDP growth.   
Thus we may conclude that, in the case of Mauritius, modest increases in spending upon 
infrastructure may lead to corresponding increases in real GDP.  Our analysis is subject to a 
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number of caveats.  We suppose that increases in infrastructure spending are compensated for by 
corresponding decreases in current spending.  Also, we have not considered alternative ways of 
distributing spending across the different types of public infrastructure, but have simply assumed 
that spending is uniformly distributed, which may be sub-optimal.  Finally, our results are 
sensitive to the estimated elasticities of Table 4, leading us to inject a word of caution in 
interpreting the results.  
VI. Conclusion 
We have constructed a dynamic multi-period general equilibrium model and have used it 
to analyze prospects for growth in two very different countries, Egypt and Mauritius.  The use of 
a single model has the advantage that when comparing alternative policies across countries, it is 
not necessary to worry if different conclusions are based solely upon model differences, as 
would be the case with multiple models.   
In the case of Egypt we have looked at a the effects of the revolution of 2011 on growth, 
in particular, at the impact of a dramatic decline in tourism.  In addressing the issue of how to 
increase growth we focused upon a particular problem in Egypt, namely the low rate of tax 
compliance.  Accordingly, we looked at fiscal policies designed to reduce tax evasion, and have 
found that these policies are also successful in modestly increasing GDP growth. 
Mauritius has not suffered from any immediate shock, as has Egypt.  However shortages 
in public infrastructure have been identified as bottlenecks in GDP growth, which, it should be 
noted, has slowed in recent years.  We have therefore estimated elasticities of private production 
with respect to stocks of public infrastructure, and have used these elasticities to implement our 
general equilibrium model.  We find that modest increases in spending upon public 
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infrastructure, compensated for by corresponding decreases in current spending, can lead to 
increases in real GDP growth.  Beyond certain levels, however, more infrastructure spending will 
actually lead to a decline in real GDP growth. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Mauritius: Time Trend of Sectoral GDP 
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Other  
 
Mauritius: Time Trend of Infrastructure Stock 
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Time Trend of Sectoral Wages & Interest Rate 
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